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Rethinking borders: The dynamics of Syrian displacement to Lebanon 
ABSTRACT: Borders and territoriality are key components of modern forms of 
statehood, yet their relevance appears to be challenged by interstate movements of 
peoples. This essay proposes a reconceptualization of borders as “thin borders” to 
develop an analytical framework of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon going 
beyond a conventional understanding of Westphalian statehood. Looking at 
historical and contemporary events, the analysis highlights several transborder 
dynamics influencing the process of refugees’ displacement from Syria to Lebanon. 
It then illustrates the complex nature of borders as multilayered entities regulating 
the flow of people from Syria to Lebanon in a way that transcends the idea of 
national territoriality. 
Keywords: Lebanon, Syria, Refugees, Borders, Territoriality, Statehood. 
Statehood, sovereignty and thus borders and territoriality have been called into 
question by the 2011 uprisings across the Middle East.1 The subsequent conflicts 
have fragmented Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq, generating a vacuum for non-state 
                                                        
1 Raffaella A. Del Sarto, "Contentious Borders in the Middle East and North Africa: 
Context and Concepts," International Affairs 93, no. 4 (2017). This research was 
partly funded by the Leverhulme Trust, Grant ECF 2014-675. 
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actors to assert their presence.2  Forced migrations from these conflicts, especially 
Syria’s, have displaced millions within and across state borders.  
No major structural change as understood by mainstream international relations 
theory has yet occurred. Salloukh observes that the “return of the weak Arab state” 
creates the conditions for revitalized transnational connections.3 Yet, old regimes 
have fought back virtually everywhere supported by external regional and global 
allies preserving the status quo ante.4 But an appraisal of the dynamics that have 
shaped the region since 2011 can no longer rely on conventional Westphalian 
assumptions of statehood and borders.  
Thinking of states as self-enclosed, national, territorial, and sovereign entities, 
inhibits understanding of the dynamics cutting across domestic, regional, and global 
spheres in the forms of popular uprisings, war, and migrations. The region has 
witnessed military interventions from outside into domestic contexts such as those 
                                                        
2 Ariel I. Ahram and Ellen Lust, "The Decline and Fall of the Arab State," Survival 58, 
no. 2 (2016); Peter Harling and Alex Simon, "Erosion and Resilience of the Iraqi-
Syrian Border," EUI working Papers RSCAS 2015, no. 61 (2015). 
3 Bassel F. Salloukh, "Overlapping Contests and Middle East International Relations: 
The Return of the Weak Arab State," PS: Political Science &amp; Politics 50, no. 3 
(2017). 
4 With the exception of Tunisia, where nevertheless revolutionary change has been 
slow, partial, and suffered several setbacks. 
 
 
in Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. Conversely, phenomena such as social 
movements, militias, migrations, and economies have spread rapidly beyond 
domestic borders. Weakened by popular uprisings, war, and mass displacement, the 
state as an autonomous institutional order has been confronted by a dense web of 
transborder relations raising questions over the nature of its territoriality and its 
capacity to act as a “society container.”5 6 
 
This essay proposes a reconceptualization of borders to provide a more accurate 
analysis of the nature of transborder dynamics, especially as concerns forced 
displacement. It proposes an analysis of the nature of borders between Syria and 
Lebanon through an adaptation of the concept of “thin border” focusing on people 
displacement from Syria to Lebanon. 7   Thin borders are characterized by greater 
permeability to flows of peoples and things, but retain their border regulative 
function. A thin border is not an equivalent for absence of border or “open” border; 
                                                        
5 John Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International 
Relations Theory," Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994). 
6 Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and 
Results," European Journal of Sociology 25, no. 2 (1984). 
7  This elaboration on the concepts of thin and thick borders partly relies on its 
theorisation in the disciplinary field of Planning Theory by Beatrix Haselsberger, 
"Decoding Borders. Appreciating Border Impacts on Space and People," Planning 
Theory & Practice 15, no. 4 (2014). 
 
 
but refers to formal or informal regimes of crossings that “filter” the flow of people or 
things through a set of constitutive layers.8 Haselsberger identifies these layers as 
political, cultural, economic, and physical “boundaries” forming the complex nature 
of the border. Whereas thin borders establish a regime of crossings for people and 
things, “thick” borders instead limit the possibility for trans-border transactions.9  
The case of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon is an opportunity to operationalize 
border thinness proposing an alternative perspective to explanations of displacement 
as merely dependent on geographical proximity. 
 
Explaining border thinness between Lebanon and Syria: a boundaries analysis 
Until 2015, the Lebanese-Syrian border has been an example of thin border because 
all its boundaries -political, economic, cultural, and physical- have been regulated in 
a way that has allowed a regular flow of people and goods.  
 
The political boundary between these two states has always been very thin. 
Historically, at the times of the Ottoman Empire, the territories of Lebanon and Syria 
did not exist, and were divided in wilayat that subsequently became part of the same 
                                                        
8 Marc Lynch “The Political and Institutional Impact of Syria’s Displacement Crisis: 
Symposium Introduction” Middle East Law and Governance 9, no.3 (2017), pp.XXX-
XXX  
9 Haselsberger 2014. 
 
 
political project of Greater Syria. During the French Mandate, however, two related 
territorial entities were constituted which subsequently became Lebanon and Syria.  
 
The project of “Greater Syria” has survived in the imaginary of political groups both 
in Lebanon and Syria. On this basis, the Syrian government and some of the Lebanese 
Panarabist factions have challenged the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon 
since its origins. Debates on Lebanon’s national identity have often featured two main 
views between Lebanon’s particularists such as Michel Chiha and Pansyrians as 
Antoun Saʿade.10 The 1958 civil unrest was primarily a clash regarding Lebanon’s 
stance towards the United Arab Republic highlighting the tensions that these 
opposing views have generated in both countries. 11  Since 1976 and the for the 
following decades the Syrian regime disputed Lebanon’s sovereignty with military 
intervention and occupation in Lebanon.  
                                                        
10  Kais M. Firro, "Lebanese Nationalism Versus Arabism: From Bulus Nujaym to 
Michel Chiha," Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 5 (2004); Michelle Hartman and 
Alessandro Olsaretti, "“The First Boat and the First Oar”: Inventions of Lebanon in the 
Writings of Michel Chiha," Radical History Review 2003, no. 86 (2003). See also Filippo 
Dionigi, "Statehood and Refugees: Patterns of Integration and Segregation of Refugee 
Populations in Lebanon from a Comparative Perspective," Middle East Law and 
Governance  (2017). on Lebanon’s geopolitical uncertainty. 
11 Fawaz Gerges, "Lebanon," in The Cold War and the Middle East, ed. Avi Shlaim and 




In the late nineties and the 2000s, Lebanese nationalism took the form of a 
widespread anti-Syrian sentiment, which eventually coalesced in the March 14 multi-
party alliance between Christian and Sunni political groups. In 2005 following a 
campaign of murders targeting Lebanese figures critical of the Syrian regime and in 
the wake of popular mobilization the March 14 movement achieved the formal 
withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanese territory. Yet, Lebanese dissent towards 
Syrian influence has been offset by political groups such as AMAL, Hezbollah, and the 
Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, which maintain close relations with the Syrian 
regime and see it a as a benevolent actor in Lebanon and the region. 
 
The long-term relations of Syria and Lebanon blur the distinction between an 
exclusively Lebanese political sphere and a Syrian political context and instead show 
that the Syrian-Lebanese political boundary is thin. The political spaces of Syrian and 
Lebanese affairs have often overlapped and clashed generating long-term phases of 
reciprocal political influence or even direct control. Instead of clearly demarking the 
end of one political space and the beginning of another, the Lebanese-Syrian political 
boundary is a place of contestation with limited capacity to contain the objectives and 
ambitions of power holders on both sides. 
 
Other examples highlight the nature of this phenomenon; for instance Syria opened 
an embassy in Lebanon only in 2008 thus formalizing diplomatic relations only at that 
 
 
point, and perhaps even more tellingly, the demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian 
borderline is currently incomplete.12  
 
The cultural boundary between Syria and Lebanon shows equally interrelated 
characteristics across the two countries. Similarly, to the rest of the region, common 
language, shared historical experience (such as the Ottoman past, the colonial 
experience or the Arab Israeli conflict), as well as religious connections, have weaved 
cultural relations between these two states. Epitomizing his Pansyrian stance, Hafez 
al-Asad used to describe provokingly the Lebanese and the Syrians as “one people in 
two states”.13 
 
As in the case of the political context, cultural connections have also been challenged, 
for example some Christian factions which have promoted Lebanon’s cultural 
specificity with reference to its Phoenicians heritage or by claiming exclusively 
Christian Maronite religious roots.14 Later on, other forms of cultural distinction have 
                                                        
12 Emma Lundgren Jörum Beyond Syria’s Borders, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017), 59. 
13  Ihsan Hijazi, "Syria-Lebanon Cooperation Pact Signed," The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/23/world/syria-lebanon-cooperation-pact-
signed.html. 
14  Kais Firro, Inventing Lebanon : Nationalism and the State under the Mandate 
(London: London : I. B. Tauris, 2003); Hartman and Olsaretti, "“The First Boat and the 
First Oar”: Inventions of Lebanon in the Writings of Michel Chiha." 
 
 
emerged, the slogan “Lebanon First” - adopted by anti-Syrian groups as al-Mustaqbal 
after 2005- epitomizes the will and interest of some social and cultural milieus of 
Lebanon to differentiate themselves from Syria also on a cultural level.15  
 
Other cultural contacts between Syria and Lebanon contribute to Lebanon-Syria 
border thinness. Links connect the Shia community of Lebanon and holy places for 
Shiism in Syria such as the Sayida Zayneb’s shrine in Damascus. 16  The Alawi 
population of the city of Tripoli maintain a special relationship with their 
coreligionists in Syria.17 There are portions of territory in which family connections 
cut across borders especially in the norther region of the AkkarʿAkkar, an area that 
enjoys a close proximity with Syria.18 The identification of Beirut as a more liberal 
cultural context compared to the traditionally Arab heritage of Syria constitutes a 
cultural distinction between these two cultural spaces, but also establishes a 
                                                        
15 Hannes Baumann, Citizen Hariri: Lebanon’s Neoliberal Reconstruction (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2017), 179. 
16 Albert Hourani, "From Jabal 'Amil to Persia," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London 49, no. 1 (1986). 
17  Raphael Lefèvre, "Lebanon’s Alawites at a Crossroads,"  Diwan (2014), 
http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55663. 
18 Michael Gilsenan, "Lebanon's Gateway to Syria: Akkar before the Civil War," Middle 
East Report, no. 162 (1990). 
 
 
complementarity. 19  For example, the newspapers of Lebanon have hosted the views 
of intellectuals that could not express their opinions in Syria, acting as the vent of 
cultural and social activities repressed in Syria. 20 These examples are indicative of 
several forms of interaction and overlapping on social and cultural levels between 
these two spaces. While maintaining distinctiveness, Syria and Lebanon cultural 
boundary does not have the function of containing unrelated cultural spaces and 
instead is characterized a historically rooted flow of relations that makes it thin. 
 
 
The Syrian-Lebanese economic boundary is probably the thinnest layer of the border 
structure. Between Lebanon and Syria there has always been an intense economic 
exchange on several levels. Syria has been for decades one of the main recipients of 
Lebanon’s exports in competition with countries as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq. 
For example, for the past twenty years, exports from Lebanon to Syria have oscillated 
between seven to ten percent of Lebanon total exports, making Syria among the top 
five recipients of its export. Syria is also a country of transition for the other 
destinations of Lebanon exports such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which can be 
                                                        
19 Samir Khalaf, Lebanon Adrift : From Battleground to Playground (London: London : 
Saqi Books, 2012). 
20  Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon : A History of the Internationalization of 
Communal Contact, The History and Society of the Modern Middle East (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), 211. 
 
 
reached by land only by crossing the border with Syria given the fact that the border 
with Israel is closed.21  
 
Exports from Syria to Lebanon are not as significant but other forms of economic 
relations link the two countries. According to Andrew Tabler, Lebanon has been the 
“Piggy Bank” of Syrian businessmen for a long time. The banking services of Lebanon 
constitute an important resource for Syria which, since the rise to power of the Baʿath 
in 1963, has nationalized its banks while Lebanese private financial institutions have 
offered world-famous secrecy and protection for Syrians business for a long time.22  
Syrian-Lebanese economic relations are also connected through dynamics of labor 
mobility. Lebanon has been the recipient of hundreds of thousands of Syrian migrants 
who, for decades, have constituted some a key resource for the labor intensive 
economic sectors, such as construction and agriculture.23 Conversely, Syrian workers 
                                                        
21 Data from the World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solutions online database, see 
http://wits.worldbank.org/  
22  Andrew Tabler, "The Economic Relationship: Beyond All Political Fallout, the 
Economies of Syria and Lebanon Remain Deeply Intertwined and Complimentary,"  
Executive (2005), http://www.executive-magazine.com/economics-policy/the-
economic-relationship. 
23  The number of Syrian workers in Lebanon is debated and fluctuates between 
300000 and 600000 see John T. Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage : Syrian Migrant Workers 
 
 
have been an important source of remittances for Syrian families back home, thus 
reinforcing the economic bond between the two countries. 
 
Sealing Lebanon’s economic relations with Syria is the 1992 Treaty of Brotherhood 
and Cooperation imposed on Lebanon in the post-Tāʾef era. 24  Among its accessory 
protocols the Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination 
states the objective of reaching economic integration between the two countries and 
establishes a set of measures for the free circulation of goods and people across the 
border with minimal administrative burdens: it formalizes a regime of exchange 
between the two countries.25  
 
A final point relates to informal trade. All the data available from official sources only 
refers to recorded transactions, yet the high informality of the economic sector in 
both countries entails that economic relations between these two countries are 
                                                        
in Lebanon, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
24  United Nations Treaty Series, "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and 
Coordination between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic," ed. 
United Nations Treaty Collection (Beirut: UN, 1992). 
25 Syrian Lebanese Higher Council, "Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation 




characterized also by a significant informal activity which further expand the volume 
of transactions and economic relations between the two states. Economic relations 
between Lebanon and Syria clearly show how the economic boundary between these 
two has been constantly crossed by forces that tend to blur the distinction between 
two separate economic spheres and instead point towards a process of integration. 
This renders also this boundary a particularly thin component of the Syrian-Lebanese 
border.  
 
The fourth border dimension of the analysis concerns the physical boundary. The 
Lebanese-Syrian territory in its frontier areas is mainly characterized by the 
mountainous reliefs of the Anti-Lebanon. The underdeveloped infrastructure and the 
relatively challenging environment have had the effect of channeling border activities 
to four official crossing points, the most important of which is Masnaʿa. 26  The 
northern border area is less mountainous and more directly connected with Syria. 
The rugged terrain of these areas means also that smuggling activity and informal 
crossing from both sides can take place unnoticed due to the difficulty of policing the 
region. Recent developments however have enhanced the capacity of the Lebanese 
Armed Forces to control this part of the territory.27 Overall, the physical character of 
                                                        
26Masnʿa, Masharʿi Al-Qaʿa, al-ʿAboudieh, al-ʿArida, the crossing point of al-Amani in 
the north is also open but not acknowledged officially.  
27  Simone Tholens, “Border management in an era of ‘statebuilding lite’: security 
assistance and Lebanon’s hybrid sovereignty” International Affairs 93, no. 4 (2017). 
 
 
the territory does not constitute a significant impediment to border crossing 
activities. 
 
The overview of all four constitutive layers of the Syrian-Lebanese border shows how 
each of these are characterized by social, political, historical, and economic relations 
that highlight a remarkable contiguity between Lebanese and Syrian spaces. Some 
sectors of society - especially in Lebanon – have vociferously advocated a sharper 
differentiation between the two countries, but at least until 2015 a fluid border 
situation has prevailed over alternative forms.  
 
Dissecting the border in its constitutive boundaries allows for an analysis of its 
structure that goes beyond a simple conceptualization of border as linear territorial 
delimitation state’s space. Instead, it illustrates its complexity showing dynamics of 
space bordering indicative of significant interaction between the two states and a 
scarce interest or capacity from both sides of containing these interactions.  
 
Border thinness during the Syrian crisis 
The events of 2011 have challenged these established patterns of the Syrian-
Lebanese border. Looking at the performance of the border, as a thin border, under 
the pressure of the Syrian humanitarian crisis provides an alternative analytical 




Lebanon has become the recipient of the highest concentration of Syrian refugees 
compared to the other neighboring countries.  Whereas the country is of course 
geographically close to Syria, geographic proximity is not the main explanation for the 
dynamics of Syrian displacement. Israel, also adjacent to Syria has received virtually no 
refugee, thus showing that social and political dynamics play an important role in the 
identification of places of destination for refugees. Lebanon did not constitute the ideal 
destination for a population in search of security and sustainable livelihood. Some 
Lebanese political and military actors - above all Hezbollah - have close relations with 
the Syrian government; similarly, other political groups sympathize with Syrian 
opposition groups. The Lebanese economy, unemployment, and the insufficient 
infrastructure can hardly be attractive for refugees. Lebanon is not the ideal context 
that a refugee population would elect for safe relocation.  
 
The political boundary level of analysis presents interesting aspects. Border thinness 
in this case means that Lebanese political actors have had direct stakes in the Syrian 
conflict that caused repercussions on the Lebanese context.  
Lebanese political actors close to the Syrian regime, in particular Hezbollah, have 
intervened in the conflict directly dispatching troops and military support. The 
closure of the border with Syria is unconceivable for its very nature of thin border. In 
a speech of 2013, when Syrian displacement was beginning to grow exponentially in 
Lebanon, Hezbollah’s secretary general Nasrallah observed that “we, as Lebanon, 
 
 
cannot close the border with Syria, with our understanding of the political, security 
and economic risks for this massive displacement.”28 
 
Al-Mustaqbal, the leading group of the March 14 alliance, instead, capitalized on the 
situation to voice criticism towards the Syrian regime and - especially in the early 
phase of the uprisings – it expected the imminent fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.  
For the critics of the Syrian regime in Lebanon, the flow of Syrian refugees was a 
useful display, powerfully demonstrating the repression of the regime against its own 
people. This message was particularly persuasive at times in which the Arab public 
was galvanized by the anti-authoritarian protests taking place across the region 
which already ousted old-time dictators as Ben ʿAli, Mubarak, and Saleh. 
Furthermore, the fact that the greatest majority of Syrians fleeing Lebanon could be 
identified as Sunni, has consolidated the connection between the al-Mustaqbal 
movement and Syrian refugees. The confessional politics of Lebanon combined with 
the growingly sectarian tones of the Syrian crisis converged. 
 
The authorities did not need to undertake special measures to allow refugees into 
Lebanon; Syrians could cross freely into Lebanon officially and unofficially thanks to 
                                                        
28 Anne Barnard, "Hezbollah Chief Urges Lebanon to Help in Syrian Crisis," The New 
York Times, 3 January 2013. 
 
 
the pre-existing loose border conditions.29 The only part of the Syrian population that 
has faced restraints to enter Lebanon were the Palestinians of Syria, who were 
allowed to enter Lebanon only at a later stage and on condition of settling in 
Palestinian camps. For Palestinians, the political boundary represented a limitation 
for their flight to safety, because contrarily to the Syrian case, Lebanese actors have 
not had interests in engaging with Palestinian politics for a long time.30 
 
The thinness of the political boundary thus created a favorable condition for the 
movement of Syrians to Lebanon, because most of the actors had clear stakes in the 
events taking place in Syria and refugees’ displacement was a phenomenon playing 
into broader political dynamics. Simultaneously with the unfolding of the Syrian 
crisis, Lebanese politics begun to experience a paralysis that brought about the 
postponement of general elections for two times, the vacancy of the presidential 
                                                        
29 See Lama Murad “Inaction as policy-making: Understanding Lebanon’s early 
response to the refugee influx” Middle East Law and Governance 9, no.3 (2017), 
pp.XXX-XXX 
30 As a matter of fact, Lebanese politics has been deliberately discriminating against 
Palestinian refugees for a long time at this point due to the traumatic experience of 
the civil war. See A. Knudsen, "Widening the Protection Gap: The 'Politics of 
Citizenship' for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 1948-2008," Journal of Refugee 
Studies 22, no. 1 (2009); Rex Brynen, "The Politics of Exile: The Palestinians in 
Lebanon," ibid.3, no. 3 (1990). 
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office from May 2014 to October 2016, and the change of four governments since 
2011 intermitted by long phases of transition. The main exception were Christian 
political groups, in particular the Free Patriotic Movement, which has voiced criticism 
towards Syrian refugee presence since the beginning; but due to the political 
paralysis in Lebanon and their limited political leverage they could not influence 
governmental decisions on this matter until the end of 2014, when border 
restrictions were enacted. 
 
As regards the thinness of cultural boundaries, these turned out to be an important 
asset for Lebanese political factions that advocated for an open border policy. The 
thinness of the cultural boundary allowed to frame 31  refugee presence into their 
political discourse as religious responsibility, or inter-Arab brotherhood, or as 
hospitality due to kinship. For Lebanese Sunni groups as al-Mustaqbal, religious 
identity and their anti-regime stance aligned, establishing a direct connection with 
Syrians fleeing into Lebanon. Syrians are referred to as “brothers” in need, protesting 
against and fleeing from a regime that their Lebanese counterparts equally resent of, 
and this establishes a responsibility towards them. In 2011, a member of al-
                                                        
31  I am referring here, broadly, to the concept of framing as present in Social 
Movement Theory applied in this case to mobilization in support of refugee presence. 
See for example: David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, 
Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51, 
no. 4 (1986). 
 
 
Mustaqbal for example declared that: "It is the responsibility of the government to 
guarantee for the [Syrian refugees] a safe place and for them to come into Lebanon to 
their families and neighbors without being attacked by any security or civil party."32 
 
From a different perspective, but with the same effect, Hezbollah and AMAL have 
justified openness towards Syrian refugees as “humanitarian responsibility” and 
reciprocity. In a public speech, Hezbollah’s secretary general Nasrallah described the 
situation as follows: “We should deal with the Syrian refugees with purely 
humanitarian responsibility, without politicization of the issue. Attention must be 
paid to the displaced families, whatever their political background.”33 
 
In a more localized perspective, small communities on the border, for example in the 
AkkarʿAkkar region of the north, have justified their reception to refugees in terms of 
“hospitality”, as related to familial connections with Syrians across the border, 
although this form of hospitality has been also buttressed by the availability of 
international aid for both refugees and host communities.34 Epitomizing the thinness 
of the cultural boundary especially in the northern region is a quote from a report in 
                                                        
32  "Lebanese Party Visits Syrian Refugees," BBC Monitoring Middle East, Nov 14 2011. 
33 Barnard, "Hezbollah Chief Urges Lebanon to Help in Syrian Crisis." 
34 Estella Carpi, "Refugee Hospitality and Humanitarian Action in Northern Lebanon: 
Between Social Order and Transborder History," in Humanitarian Aid on the Move 
(Beirut: Groupe U.R.D., 2016). 
 
 
the early days of the crisis in June 2011, when the movement of refugees began from 
the areas of Talkhalak and al-ʿArida:  
 
There is no demarcation line between the borders of northern Lebanon and 
Syria. Inter-marriages between the people who live in between the two 
regions are common therefore; they have family ties in the villages and towns 
in the northern areas of Lebanon. As a result, most of the displaced Syrians had 
stayed with family and other relatives once they have crossed the border into 
Lebanese territory.35 
 
In this case the framing of the humanitarian situation has not been related to the 
political nature of the protests in Syria, and instead public discourse could cite 
religious, cultural, kinship and historical relations as justifications of Syrian presence 
in Lebanon, associated with the fact that the Lebanese enjoyed Syrians’ protection in 
times of war and shared a common history of displacement during the conflicts with 
Israel and the civil war. 
 
Border thinness also related to economic dynamics. The economic boundary with 
Syria has remained open and operative during the conflict. Although the availability 
of data is intermittent and does not cover abundant informal activities; Lebanon did 
                                                        
35 International Medical Corps, "Psychosocial Assessment of Displaced Syrians at the 
Lebanese-Syrian Northern Border," (Beirut: International Medical Corps, 2011). 
 
 
suffer an economic setback but it is not obvious to claim that this is related only to the 
Syrian crisis. At least until 2015 Lebanon’s export to Syria increased, whereas the 
imports have decreased, thus the balance of trade in fact turned in favor of Lebanon. 
There have been phases of border closures, and the fact that the Jordanian border 
with Syria has been closed has slowed down trade, but overall the Syrian-Lebanese 
boundary has remained a vital economic channel.36  
 
The thinness of the economic boundary depends also on the fact that hundreds of 
thousands of Syrian workers have been employed in Lebanon for decades. This has 
played a significant role in the dynamics of their displacement. In a meeting with the 
author, for example, the mayor of a small municipality in the Biqaʿa Valley has 
indicated that many of the Syrians that resettled in his area had previous experience 
of working there. According to a rough estimate, he claimed that about ten per cent 
of the Syrians in his municipality had previous experience of working in Lebanon. 
This may seem a relatively limited amount but the mayor then explained that, 
differently from the pre-crisis years, this time Syrian workers brought their families 
with them. This has a multiplying effect: each Syrian worker/refugee also had a family 
group with him relocating to Lebanon. 37  The International Labour Organization 
                                                        
36Massimilano Calì et al., "The Impact of the Syrian Conflict on Lebanese Trade," in 
World Bank Reports (Washington: World Bank, 2015). 




observes that of a sample population of economically active Syrian refugees, twenty 
per cent of them had previous experience of employment in Lebanon, and that having 
worked in Lebanon before increases the chances of finding a job while relocating to 
Lebanon.38  The thin economic boundary, played a role in shaping the dynamics of 
displacement because the economic relations that existed before the crisis 
established a degree of path-dependency for Syrians to relocate to an area in which 
they previous experience of work. 
 
Finally, as concerns the physical boundary, the fact that the border regions of 
Lebanon with Syria are characterized by a conformation of territory that is difficult 
to monitor where there is no official borderline has facilitated the informal access of 
Syrians to Lebanese territory. This has also caused the reverse phenomenon whereby 
Syrians could travel back and forth from their country usually to check on their 
property or for short trips to their place of origin.  
 
Conceptualizing borders not as simple territorial demarcations but as complex multi-
layered entities allows illustrating the conditions that have generated a process of 
displacement unprecedented for speed, intensity, and magnitude. The thin political 
boundary between Lebanon and Syria let the repercussions of the conflict 
                                                        
38 Sawsan Masr and Ilina Srour, "Assessment Fot He Impact of Syrian Refugees in 




reverberating directly in the Lebanese political context. Cultural connections have 
provided most political actors with the opportunity to frame refugee presence in 
discourses of hospitality towards Syrian refugees. A history of economic relations and 
labor transfer has constituted a migratory imprint which some refugees have used as 
compass for their relocation. Finally, the physical boundary has rendered border 
policing more difficult and then informal crossing easier.  
 
Whereas geographic proximity between the two countries is an influential aspect, 
border thinness explains the modes, contexts, and selectivity of Syrian displacement. 
The fast and robust flow of refugees as well as the unwillingness and incapability to 
close the border, show that an idea of territorialized state and society contained by 
nationalized borders hardly applies especially at a point in which the Syrian state is 
weakened by a devastating crisis. Instead, the closely connected political, cultural, 
and economic spaces of Lebanon and Syria constitute a space for interaction between 
refugees, political elites, and host communities that transcend state territoriality.  
 
Thickening the border  
The Syrian uprisings turned into a conflict where not only domestic forces clashed 
but also regional and global actors intervened. The possibility of a quick transition in 
power, expected by al-Assad’s critics and feared by his allies, vanished.  The change 
from uprising to protracted conflict, transformed the perception of its repercussions 
within the Lebanese context. The critics of al-Assad’s regime in Lebanon became less 
interested in tying their politics to the conflict in Syria, thus assent to the presence of 
 
 
Syrians in Lebanon became less prominent. By 2013, Syrian refugee presence had 
begun to exact a price in political capital, since local administrations were 
increasingly affected by the demographic pressure.  
 
In April 2014, the UNHCR reported the registration of more than a million Syrian 
refugees, roughly equivalent to one quarter of Lebanon’s autochthonous population. 
The picture became even more complex in June 2014, when the Syrian regime held 
presidential elections. In that occasion, tens of thousands of Syrians marched towards 
the Syrian embassy in Beirut, chanting pro-regime slogans in a show of support for 
the regime.39  The political forces opposed to the Syrian government - and keener to 
acquiesce to Syrian refugee presence - were surprised by this display of support for 
the regime.40 The changed perception of refugee presence, eventually precipitated a 
policy change over border regulation.  
 
                                                        
39  Jim Muir, "Syria Election: Refugees Vote in Lebanon and Jordan," BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27599868. 
40  Following the election, the general secretariat of March 14 even released a 
declaration calling for the deportation of those Syrians that have participated to the 
mobilization in occasion of the electoral consolation. Now Lebanon, "March 14 





In October 2014, Lebanon’s council of ministers adopted a new policy proposed by 
Christian party leaders and endorsed by most political groups the main purpose of 
which was restricting access to Lebanese territory and creating an incentive for 
Syrians to leave Lebanon.41 The decision of the council, implemented in January 2015, 
made harder and more expensive the renewal of residency permits for refugees in 
Lebanon. In addition, the border crossing was de facto forbidden to Syrians in 
humanitarian need. For the first time in decades in Lebanese-Syrian relations, a 
regime of border restriction was activated; the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon 
protested that the decision was taken without the consensus of the Syrian 
government.42   
 
The 2015 border policy is not a blanket closure but a filter that modulates entrance 
to Lebanon, in different ways for each of the constitutive boundaries of the Syrian 
Lebanese border. This measure marked a change in the nature of the Syrian-Lebanese 
border but not a full closure across all its boundaries. For example, Syrians are 
admitted if they can demonstrate that they travel for business, if they are sponsored 
                                                        
41 Presidency of the Council of Ministers, "2014 جلسة 23 تشرين األول [Session of the 23 
October 2014]," ed. Council of Ministers (Beirut2014). 
42 Molly Hennessy-Fiske and Nabih Bulos, "Lebanon's New Visa Rules for Syrians Aim 





by an employer, if they own assets in Lebanon, such as real estate, or if they have 
travel documents or a hotel booking which demonstrate their transit in the country. 
 
The political boundary at this point has “thickened” because— disillusioned by the 
outcome of the uprisings in Syria— the critics of the Syrian regime in Lebanon had 
less interest in projecting their influence on the dynamics of the conflict across the 
border. The only political actor that has remained fully committed to shaping the 
Syrian conflict is Hezbollah, which -in spite of any border restrictions- has kept 
moving freely its troops and armaments across the border. For most others, isolating 
from it was in their best interest and that of their constituencies, now that the 
demographic pressure has reached a limit and the loyalty of the refugees to the anti-
regime camp was not as clear-cut.  
 
The cultural boundary witnessed a parallel process, whereby the rhetoric of 
solidarity, hospitality, and brotherhood has been progressively outdone by a sense of 
fatigue, the exacerbation of sectarian dynamics, and the exacerbation of a “Lebanese 
Vs Syrian” public discourse especially within local administrations.43 Some indicators 
                                                        
43 The possibility of a spill over of the Syrian conflict in Lebanon has materialised in a 
stream of attacks with a clear sectarian tone that has hit the country in several 
occasions. Furthermore, a confrontation emerged between a rising Salafist and 
sectarian movement and militia headed by a Sheikh Ahmad al-ʿAsir, which has been 
 
 
are phenomena such as the curfews targeting the mobility of Syrian refugees, or the 
intention to strip Syrians of their status of “displaced” when travelling back and forth 
from Syria.44 Political interests and the narrative of hospitality and responsibility in 
which it was previously framed misaligned and a sharper distinction between a 
Lebanese and Syrian space emerged. 
 
In contrast with political and cultural boundaries the measures of 2015 did not apply 
to the economic boundary, that was left deliberately thin. Given the economic 
interdependence between the two states - especially as concerns trade and labor - 
this is not surprising. As mentioned above, reasons such as business, trade, or work 
sponsorships, allowed for the circulation of Syrians.  The selectiveness of this policy 
then shows how border policy can be arranged differently across its boundaries: 
border policies can rarely be captured by simple “open or close” descriptions. 
 
                                                        
subsequently repressed and his leader arrested. These episodes nevertheless remain 
sporadic and failed to ignite a conflict on a sustained scale.  
44  Human Rights Watch, "Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian 
Refugees," Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/03/lebanon-
least-45-local-curfews-imposed-syrian-refugees; Now Lebanon, "Derbas: Return 





The physical boundary cannot be easily modified unless by building fences or through 
surveillance devices that modify the boundary in its physical possibility to be crossed. 
The Lebanese government has been progressively reinforcing its surveillance along 
the border— also thanks to military aid and training from international donors- but 
the new measures of 2015 have not modified the physical boundary significantly. 
 
The result of the 2015 policy change is a disarticulation of the structure of the border 
from one that was equally thin across all its layers, and receptive of Syrians in general, 
to a form of border filtering which has rendered crossing difficult for Syrians in 
humanitarian need.  The renewal of residency permits for refugees already present 
in Lebanese territory has been made more difficult. Intensified procedures have been 
introduced including the production of official documents concerning the place of 
residence of refugees, and harsher measures prohibiting their employment.  
 
Consequently, Syrians have been increasingly pushed outside political and cultural 
boundaries, but those who had an economic status could still take advantage of the 
thinness of the economic boundary. These new measures, therefore, failed to 
effectively raise a thick border between the Syrian and Lebanese context in two ways. 
The first is that border crossing is limited but still possible when meeting certain, 
primarily economic, conditions. The second and more important aspect is that the 
heavily bureaucratized residency renewal procedures did not constitute an incentive 
for return or relocation of Syrians. Instead, this measure has pushed the greatest 
 
 
majority of the population into a condition of “irregularity” due to the fact that many 
could not renew their residency permits.  
 
But this situation prefigures not the creation of separate territorial spaces - as it 
would be expected by the rise of effective international borders - but the development 
of other forms of overlapping and “liminal space” 45 .  Some Syrians can still take 
advantage of the scarce containment capacity of borders between Syria and Lebanon 
especially when economic conditions allow. On the other hand, Syrians already in 
Lebanon have been excluded through regulation from their regular status in Lebanon, 
but -unable and unwilling to leave Lebanon- are still a physical presence in the 
Lebanese territory. This relegates them to a liminal space where they are not in 
Lebanon - as they are not legally within it - but they are not outside it, because they 
are within Lebanese territory and society. The 2015 regulation therefore, has failed 
to demarcate a thick border between Syria and Lebanon. In fact, it has generated the 
opposite a “borderland” 46  an even more extensive space in which Lebanese and 
Syrians boundaries are indistinct. 
 
                                                        
45 Michel Agier, Borderlands : Towards an Anthropology of the Cosmopolitan Condition, 
trans. David Fernbach (2016). See also I. William Zartman, Understanding Life in the 
Borderlands : Boundaries in Depth and in Motion, ed. I. William Zartman (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2010). 




Studying border thinness between Lebanon and Syria is a way of going beyond 
Westphalian assumptions on the state as a nationally, self-enclosed, territorially 
contained, sovereign entity. Instead it highlights how borders are instruments to 
project power beyond the domestic sphere of sovereignty from both sides. More 
broadly, this approach could shed light on the fast and fluid trans-border dynamics 
that have shaped Middle Eastern politics and society, especially since 2011, striking 
a balance between the overall dismissal of borders relevance and the adoption of a 
fully territorialized conception of the state. 
 
The point, nevertheless, is not to make an exceptionalist argument about Middle 
Eastern statehood. As observed by Wendy Brown and others, the international order 
at large is increasingly post-Westphalian and the proliferation of walls as borders 
protection is symptomatic of the global waning of state territoriality and not of its 
return.47  
 
What is unique is the historical and social context that has shaped the development 
of thin borders between Lebanon and Syria and between other Middle Eastern states; 
thinness which has been further developed by the crisis of the Syrian state. In addition 
to the brutality of the conflict and the geographical proximity, border thinness is a 
                                                        
47 Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York Cambridge, Mass.: 
Zone Books, 2010), 21. 
 
 
factor explaining the magnitude and rapidity of the refugee crisis in Lebanon: the 
country with the highest concentration of Syrian refugees in the world.  
Politically, the Syrian events of 2011 and 2012 - given the broader context of a region 
in turmoil— resounded directly in the Lebanese environment making the thinness of 
the political boundary most evident. The thinness of the cultural boundary is clear in 
the process of framing of Syrian presence in Lebanon, it overrides nationalist 
objections to refugee presence, marking a sharp contrast with states (for example in 
the western hemisphere) where forced displacement has been used to ignite 
nationalist populism. The intense economic exchange between these two countries 
has constituted a robust pattern of interdependence that has inhibited restrictions on 
border crossings. 
 
Yet borders, even thin borders, maintain a regulative function. Thin borders are not a 
euphemism for weak, open, or redundant border. They retain a filtering function,48 
for instance in their discrimination against Palestinian Syrians. Furthermore, in 2015 
Lebanon enacted measures that have changed the dynamics of flow especially with 
respect to Syrians in humanitarian need, adding further filtering to border crossing. 
Syrian who intended to cross into Lebanon for humanitarian reasons were 
discriminated against at the border, whereas those who were already in Lebanon or 
intended to travel to Lebanon for economic reasons could benefit from the fact that 
the economic boundary was kept thin by Lebanese authorities. This has produced a 
                                                        




disarticulation of the border from general thinness to different degrees across 
different layers.  Refugees unable to access Lebanon or to renew their residency 
permits have been relegated into a liminal space delimited at one end by the 
restrictions imposed by the 2015 new regulation and by Syrian inhabitability on the 
other end.49 The political and cultural thickening of the boundary has isolated Syrian 
refugees and confined them to what Michel Agier would define a “borderland”: an 
area where people cannot cross completely the border and therefore becomes a 
“border dweller” neither inside nor outside a territorycountry.50 
 
The dynamics of forced displacement between Syria and Lebanon show how society, 
politics, and economics, are hardly contained within bordered state institutions and 
transcend this spatiality producing creatingforming a web of relations which a 
conventional conception of territoriality would fail to describeexpose.    
  
                                                        
49 To be noticed is the fact that in early 2017 the costs and procedures for the renewal 
of residency permits have been temporarily waived for Syrians already registered 
with UNHCR in Lebanon as part of an agreement between UNHCR Lebanon and the 
Ministry of Interior. 
50 Borderlands in Lebanon and elsewhere can be extensive and densely populated, for 
example the condition of Palestinian refugees and that of tens of thousands of 
stateless individuals in this country very much resembles this status of suspension in 
between borders. Agier, Borderlands, 58. 
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